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TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
BRIAN TAYLOR SUMNER 
INTRODUCTION 
In international law and relations, ownership of territory is 
significant because sovereignty over land defines what constitutes a 
state.1 Additionally, as Machiavelli suggested, territorial acquisition is 
one of the goals of most states.2 The benefits of having territory, 
though, are only as great as a state’s borders are clear, because a 
state’s boundaries must be well defined for the modern state to 
function.3 In many cases, however, these boundaries are subject to 
competing international territorial claims.4 Such claims can be 
generally divided into nine categories: treaties, geography, economy, 
culture, effective control, history, uti possidetis,5 elitism, and ideology.6 
States have relied on all nine categories to justify legal claims to 
territory before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The most 
 
Copyright © 2004 by Brian Taylor Sumner. 
 1. See PAUL GILBERT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATIONALISM 91 (1998) (“To claim a right 
to statehood is to claim a right to some territory over which the state can exercise political 
control.”); John Agnew, The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International 
Relations Theory, 1 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 53, 53 (1994) (asserting that “the clear spatial 
demaraction of the territory within which the state exercises its power” is one aspect of political 
theory definitions of the state). 
 2. See NICOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 25 (W.K. Marriott ed., J.M. Dent & Sons 
1938) (1513) (“The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common . . . .”). This principle is 
the state-level extension of human territoriality, or the “spatial strategy to affect, influence, or 
control resources and people, by controlling area.” ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN 
TERRITORIALITY: ITS THEORY AND HISTORY 1 (1986). 
 3. GILBERT, supra note 1, at 92. See generally MALCOLM ANDERSON, FRONTIERS: 
TERRITORY AND STATE FORMATION IN THE MODERN WORLD 1–36 (1996) (describing the 
historical and modern importance of frontiers). 
 4. International territorial claims are claims to particular territory made by a state either 
seeking sovereignty or affirming its preexisting sovereignty over that territory. 
 5. Uti possidetis is the doctrine under which “old administrative boundaries will become 
international boundaries when a political subdivision achieves independence.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1544 (7th ed. 1999). For example, the external boundaries of the United States 
after achieving independence—based on the preindependence colonial boundaries—reflected 
the uti possidetis principle. 
 6. For a discussion of these categories, see infra Part I. 
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common claims are cast in terms of effective control of the disputed 
territory, historical right to title, uti possidetis, geography, treaty law, 
and cultural homogeneity. 
This Note examines the interplay and hierarchy among these 
nine justifications in the outcomes of land boundary cases adjudicated 
by the ICJ to determine whether one particular justification is 
dispositive—or, at the minimum, highly determinative. This analysis 
of the case law indicates that no single justification operates as the 
decision rule in the court’s boundary dispute jurisprudence, and that 
the court manifests a hierarchical preference for treaty law, uti 
possidetis, and effective control, respectively.7 
Part I discusses the nine categories of justifications for territorial 
claims; their evolution in geography, political science, and the law; 
and their application in certain areas of particular interest here. Part 
II presents an analysis of the ICJ’s land dispute jurisprudence with 
regard to the bases for territorial claims set out in Part I. Part III 
argues that the ICJ uses a tripartite hierarchy when it analyzes 
territorial disputes. Part IV critiques this hierarchy in light of modern 
territorial disputes. 
 
 7. This Note considers only a small segment of all territorial disputes and only one means 
of international dispute resolution, addressing only those disputes adjudicated by the ICJ. For 
an examination of why states choose international legal processes for the resolution of 
territorial disputes, see generally Beth Simmons, See You in “Court”? The Appeal to Quasi-
Judicial Legal Processes in the Settlement of Territorial Disputes, in A ROAD MAP TO WAR: 
TERRITORIAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 205 (Paul F. Diehl ed., 1999). 
Furthermore, this Note considers only land disputes; it does not consider maritime 
disputes, maritime boundary delimitations, or disputes over islands in which the crux of the legal 
question derives from the law of the sea. The nine traditional categories of justifications for 
territorial claims apply uniformly only to land disputes. 
Several scholars distinguish between territorial disputes and border disputes. See, e.g., 
A.O. CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 
(1967); NORMAN HILL, CLAIMS TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS 25 
(1945); R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (1963); 
SURYA P. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION, DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 21–28 
(1997). For the purposes of this Note’s inquiry, the difference is immaterial. Border disputes and 
territorial disputes both involve, at their core, sovereignty over disputed land. The ICJ’s 
judgments in several cases bear out the interdependent nature of these two issues. See, e.g., 
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 12 (June 15) (“To decide this 
question of territorial sovereignty, the Court must have regard to the frontier line between the 
two States . . . .”); Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg./Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209, 212 
(June 20) (examining the frontier between Belgium and the Netherlands in a territorial 
sovereignty dispute); see also SHARMA, supra, at 26–27 (reviewing cases “confirming the 
interdependent nature of the two categories”). 
SUMNER FINISHED.DOC 2/9/2005 11:06 AM 
2004] TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 1781 
I.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TERRITORIAL CLAIMS 
Cases may come before the ICJ, an independent subsidiary organ 
of the United Nations,8 by referral through a compromis (special 
agreement) between two or more states,9 by a treaty provision 
committing disputes arising under the treaty to the court,10 or by the 
parties’ statements of compulsory jurisdiction.11 Under Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Statute), when 
deciding cases “in accordance with international law,” the court 
applies the following sources of law: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,  
  establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted  
  as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the  
  teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various  
  nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of  
  law.12 
Furthermore, if the parties agree, the court may decide a case under 
equity principles, ex aequo et bono.13 
Territorial claims before the ICJ usually fall within one of the 
above four categories. Treaty claims are the easiest to assert, because 
the existence of a treaty is easier to prove than the existence of 
customary international law, which requires evidence of state practice 
and opinio juris,14 or the existence of the highly enigmatic general 
 
 8. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, arts. 1–2, 16–20, 59 Stat. 
1055, 1055, 1057, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm 
[hereinafter ICJ Statute] (providing for the independence of the court and its judges). 
 9. Id. art. 36, para. 1, 59 Stat. at 1060. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Compromissory 
Clauses and the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 855 (1987) 
(reviewing the scope of the ICJ’s compromissory jurisdiction). 
 10. ICJ Statute, supra note 8, art. 36, para. 1, 59 Stat. at 1060. 
 11. Id. art. 36, para. 2, 59 Stat. at 1060. 
 12. Id. art. 38, para. 1, 59 Stat. at 1060. 
 13. Id. art. 38, para. 2, 59 Stat. at 1060; see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (7th ed. 1999) 
(defining “ex aequo et bono” as “according to what is equitable and good”). In the drafting of 
the Statute, the expressions “equity,” “justice,” and “ex aequo et bono” were used 
interchangeably. MASAHIRO MIYOSHI, CONSIDERATIONS OF EQUITY IN THE SETTLEMENT OF 
TERRITORIAL AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES 14 (1993). It appears that this would permit the court 
“to avoid the application of law and decide ex aequo et bono instead.” Id. 
 14. See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 23–24 (1953) (“In Article 38 . . . custom is used in a strict sense, being 
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principles of law “recognized by civilized nations.”15 However, in the 
absence of treaties, litigants must resort to claims based on the other 
three international law categories, and to nonlegal or political claims. 
Among the several categories into which scholars classify these 
justifications, the most common nine are treaties, geography, 
economy, culture, effective control, history, uti possidetis, elitism, and 
ideology.16 Although several claims may cross lines between 
categories, this Note attempts to place claims in the category that best 
describes the underlying justification for sovereignty. This Part 
proceeds by discussing each of the nine categories as they have 
evolved in geography, political science, and law. 
A. Treaty Law 
As compared to the other bases for territorial claims, the treaty 
justification is more legal in nature—that is, it is less emotionally 
persuasive than an historical claim might be. Nevertheless, claims 
based on treaty law are particularly persuasive at the ICJ because 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute obligates the court to consider treaties. 
Moreover, through treaties parties agree to relinquish their historical 
or other claims to the property subject to the treaty. Thus, it is no 
surprise that treaties (unless defective) are binding on the parties that 
have ratified them. 
The purpose of many treaties is much like that of private 
contracts.17 For both, the chief goal of the relationship is “to create 
 
conformed to what is a general practice among States accepted by them as law.”). Opinio juris 
requires that the state behavior result from a sense of legal obligation. MARK W. JANIS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 46–47 (4th ed. 2003). 
 15. ICJ Statute, supra note 8, art. 38, para. 1, 59 Stat. at 1060.  
 16. This Note adopts, with certain modifications, the categorization system of Professor 
Andrew Burghardt, The Bases of Territorial Claims, 63 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 225 (1973), who 
presents seven categories of territorial claims: effective control, historical, cultural, territorial 
integrity, economic, elitist, and ideological. Professor Burghardt’s categories are defined broadly 
enough that they provide ready application to the ICJ’s jurisprudence. As this Part 
demonstrates, this Note expands upon Professor Burghardt’s classification and further develops 
some of his categories. Professor Burghardt is a political geographer best known for his work on 
Burgenland, Austria. For alternative systems, see NORMAN J.G. POUNDS, POLITICAL 
GEOGRAPHY 252–59 (2d ed. 1972), proposing seven alternative categories of territorial claims 
(strategic, economic, ethnic, proximity, sphere of influence, geographical, and acquisition), and 
ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ & STEFAN T. POSSONY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF 
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP 278 (1950), which offers a set of 
ten criteria for border definition. 
 17. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 74 (1991). 
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legally recognizable expectations” in the other contracting party.18 
The parties to a treaty, as to a contract, then rely on those 
expectations in carrying out their own affairs, because they entered 
into the agreement voluntarily and with a view to “structur[ing] their 
relationship in the way that best suits their . . . interests.”19 Although 
the enforcement of contracts is rather clear (one can almost always 
resort to litigation), the enforcement of treaties is more ambiguous. 
Many treaties contain their own enforcement provisions permitting 
parties to take certain actions in response to breach or to refer 
disputes to the ICJ; historically, many treaty disputes have been 
resolved by force. 
Despite the appeal of treaties as contractual agreements between 
parties to a territorial dispute, a particular difficulty with the ICJ’s use 
of treaty law is the application of a certain treaty to states not party to 
the agreement.20 In most of these cases, the treaties are used to 
demonstrate the consent of other states (possibly colonial powers) 
with respect to boundaries later inherited by the litigants before the 
ICJ. In others, the court may employ treaties as factual evidence of 
how the borders stood at a particular time.21 
B. Geography 
Geographical justifications for territorial boundaries are neither 
novel nor uncommon. Mountain ranges, rivers, oceans, and other 
bodies of water and physical formations have perennially separated 
political entities.22 Natural borders create a clear dividing line 
between two states, offer a buffer of security (or at least the 
appearance thereof), often do not require active patrolling by border 
guards, and historically have been more difficult to dispute than 
borders less easily identifiable by a physical landmark.23 Sometimes 
 
 18. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 1 (4th ed. 2001); see also JANIS, supra note 14, at 9 (“International agreements, like 
private contracts, are something more than statements of expected future conduct. Treaties 
create legal rights and duties, and it is this obligatory aspect that makes them part of 
international law.”). 
 19. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 18, at 9. 
 20. See infra notes 108–17 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.  
 22. Burghardt, supra note 16, at 235–37. 
 23. See CUKWURAH, supra note 7, at 19–22 (considering boundaries in mountains, deserts, 
watercourses, swamps, and marshes). 
SUMNER FINISHED.DOC 2/9/2005 11:06 AM 
1784 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1779 
the reasoning behind geographical claims is more psychological—
what Professor Norman Hill dubs “geographical predestination.”24 
Natural boundaries, however, can present neighboring states 
with problems of precision in demarcation, delimitation, or both.25 
Natural boundaries, by their nature, can be difficult to mark.26 The 
natural formations that create boundaries can move, thereby making 
resource allocations in the frontier region more problematic. 
Natural boundaries may also carry strategic importance because 
they confer military advantages27—they can thwart enemy advances 
and reduce costs by diminishing the necessity for heavy 
fortifications.28 This strategic value often encourages states to extend 
their borders to beneficial physical formations under the justification 
of territorial integrity.29 
C. Economy 
Economic justifications for territorial claims assert that the 
territory in question is “necessary to the viability or development of 
 
 24. HILL, supra note 7, at 74; see also POUNDS, supra note 16, at 257 (pointing to U.S. 
manifest destiny as an example of a claim based on proximity); Burghardt, supra note 16, at 236 
(commenting on manifest destiny and pan-Africanism); Peter Sahlins, Natural Frontiers 
Revisited: France’s Boundaries Since the Seventeenth Century, 95 AM. HIST. REV. 1423 (1990) 
(discussing the role of natural frontiers in French state building). 
 25. HILL, supra note 7, at 24; see also CUKWURAH, supra note 7, at 27–29 (explaining the 
distinction between delimitation and demarcation); Bradford L. Thomas, International 
Boundaries: Lines in the Sand (and the Sea), in REORDERING THE WORLD: GEOPOLITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 87, 94 (George J. Demko & William B. Wood 
eds., 1994) (same). 
 26. See HILL, supra note 7, at 24 (discussing the difficulties inherent in demarcating natural 
boundaries). 
 27. Mark W. Zacher, The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use 
of Force, 55 INT’L ORG. 215, 244 (2001); see also Guntram H. Herb, National Identity and 
Territory, in NESTED IDENTITIES: NATIONALISM, TERRITORY, AND SCALE 9, 20 (Guntram H. 
Herb & David H. Kaplan eds., 1999) (pointing to the strategic importance of mountaintops). 
Sea access and terrain for railroads are also of great strategic (and economic) importance, 
because they permit the development and deployment of navies and facilitate the internal 
transportation of military materiel. See POUNDS, supra note 16, at 254–56 (discussing the 
economic importance of terrain for railroads and access to the coast). 
 28. See HILL, supra note 7, at 53 (“[N]ations seek frontiers that are naturally adapted to 
defense, and try to avoid weak, artificial frontiers. . . . Without strategic frontiers a nation feels 
obligated to erect expensive fortifications.”). 
 29. See Burghardt, supra note 16, at 236 (commenting on the U.S. acquisition of Florida, 
Yugoslavia’s claim to Trieste, and the Romanian claim to the entire Banat); see also HILL, supra 
note 7, at 141–42 (“Although the principle of contiguity as the basis for a legal claim to territory 
has not received a great deal of support, it has been used with some weight as a non-legal claim, 
particularly to colonies.”). 
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the state.”30 For example, the territory may be necessary to facilitate 
internal and international transportation routes for goods (including 
pipelines, roads, railways, and ports), to exploit raw materials, to 
cultivate land, and the like.31 Similarly, states may desire the territory 
to attract foreign investment,32 which requires the existence of land, 
sea, and aerial passages.33 
Economic claims also include the more novel claim that certain 
territory should belong to the claimant because it “has been in . . . 
close economic relation” with territory already within the claimant’s 
jurisdiction.34 States commonly make this claim with respect to 
colonies, focusing on the domestic need for raw materials, markets for 
finished goods, and new ports for cheaper exporting.35 
D. Culture 
Cultural justifications are based on the “ethnic nation” argument, 
which underlies any justification for drawing a border in a specific 
place because of a common language, religion, kinship, or other 
cultural characteristic that defines the group of people living in a 
particular territory.36 At the core of the cultural claim is a sense of 
 
 30. Burghardt, supra note 16, at 237; see also Lea Brilmayer & Natalie Klein, Land and 
Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in Search of a Common Denominator, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 703, 730–31 (2001) (examining the economic value of control over land and water). But see 
Zacher, supra note 27, at 244 (asserting that economic justifications for seizing land are less 
forceful today because agricultural production is less significant). 
 31. See HILL, supra note 7, at 106 (“The most common economic claim made to territory is 
the need for raw materials and industrial products.”); Burghardt, supra note 16, at 237–38 
(discussing economic claims to “[p]ort cities . . . railroad lines, ship channels, and mineral 
deposits”). 
 32. See BETH A. SIMMONS, TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND THEIR RESOLUTION: THE CASE 
OF ECUADOR AND PERU 3 (U.S. Inst. of Peace, Peaceworks No. 27, 1999) (arguing that border 
stability enhances investor confidence and assists exporters).  
 33. See HILL, supra note 7, at 92 (articulating the two principal means by which states 
acquire sea access: “annexation of territory containing rivers that lead to the seaports of a 
neighboring state” and “acquisition of territory with a coast line and seaports”). 
 34. Id. at 107 (describing Italy’s claim to the Trentino region in the 1860s). 
 35. Id. at 112–14. 
 36. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 219–24 (1985) (discussing 
self-determination in the context of language); Herb, supra note 27, at 12 (discussing ethnic 
identity based on “the commonality of language and culture”); David B. Knight, People 
Together, Yet Apart: Rethinking Territory, Sovereignty, and Identities, in REORDERING THE 
WORLD: GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 25, at 71, 
74–75 (noting the “religious, political, cultural, historical, and psychological bases” of group 
territorial identities); Juan J. Linz, From Primordialism to Nationalism, in NEW NATIONALISMS 
OF THE DEVELOPED WEST: TOWARD EXPLANATION 203, 204 (Edward A. Tiryakian & Ronald 
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belonging, but the characteristic creating this belonging varies by 
group and region.37 In modern Western history, language has been the 
chief unifier, whereas in the Middle East religion has played that 
role.38 Language has also been used as a distinguishing characteristic 
that has enabled ruling classes to emerge to the detriment of minority 
groups.39 In a territorial claim based on culture, the claimant state 
contends that because of shared pasts, the inhabitants of the disputed 
territory share the “same national background and aspirations” as the 
inhabitants of the claimant state.40 
Cultural claims to territory are often analogized to claims based 
on the doctrine of self-determination,41 which draws state boundaries 
corresponding to the distribution of national groups within the 
territory,42 regardless of how such groups may be defined.43 Ideally, 
self-determinative actions would result in a more culturally 
homogenous state. This is by no means the norm, however, because 
of group overlap and irreconcilable circumstances such as intractable 
intergroup conflicts and racial and religious intermixing.44 Ironically, 
in such circumstances, those who previously decried the injustice of 
being ruled by a foreign minority may end up attempting to 
homogenize the territory by pursuing policies of exclusion, expulsion, 
or violence.45 
 
Rogowski eds., 1985) (commenting that many nationalist movements referred to primordial ties 
“based on a common language, culture, distinctive religion, or kinship”); Zacher, supra note 27, 
at 244 (asserting that states seek to acquire territory to “protect[] . . . ethnic compatriots who are 
being mistreated in other states”). 
 37. See Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 30, at 731 (noting that people “develop strong 
attachments to the places where they settle into communities”); Malcolm N. Shaw, Territory in 
International Law, 13 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 61, 63 (1982) (noting that territory contributes to “a 
sense of group identity”). 
 38. Burghardt, supra note 16, at 233. 
 39. See Herb, supra note 27, at 19–20 (arguing that language can be an ineffective method 
of defining the spatiality of nations because of minorities on the periphery). 
 40. HILL, supra note 7, at 119. 
 41. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966, art. 1, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (“All peoples have the right of self-determination.”); 
see also U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (“To develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . .”). 
 42. HILL, supra note 7, at 115; see also Herb, supra note 27, at 11–13 (discussing the 
application of self-determination principles in the post-World War I and post-World War II 
periods). 
 43. See supra text accompanying notes 38–39. 
 44. HILL, supra note 7, at 115; see also Burghardt, supra note 16, at 235 (citing examples of 
states with strong ethnic minorities). 
 45. See HOROWITZ, supra note 36, at 197–201 (discussing ethnic exclusion). 
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E. Effective Control 
A claim based on effective control is one in which a group claims 
certain land because the group has “uncontested administration of 
the land and its resident population.”46 Many scholars believe that 
under international law, effective control is the shibboleth—indeed, 
the sine qua non—of a strong territorial claim.47 Under property law 
generally, possession is a large factor in the determination of a 
property right.48 Professor Andrew Burghardt acknowledges that the 
principal questions surrounding any such claim are twofold: (1) what 
constitutes an abandonment of the land by the last governing entity, 
and (2) what constitutes administration of the land.49 
The status of abandonment as a precondition to effective control 
is highly debatable. One scholar would require that the land be terra 
nullius50—a “territory not belonging to any particular country.”51 
Previously, only discovered land was terra nullius; now, the term 
encompasses land over which no state exercises sovereign control.52 
Another scholar defines abandonment as a “failure to maintain a 
minimum degree of sovereign activity.”53 When the rightful sovereign 
acquiesces in the control of territory by the infringing sovereign, the 
requirement of abandonment is inapplicable altogether.54 This is the 
legal doctrine of acquisition by acquiescence, generally accepted by 
common lawyers and rejected by civil lawyers.55 In many ways, it is 
analogous to the common law principle of title by adverse possession. 
 
 46. Burghardt, supra note 16, at 228; see also Shaw, supra note 37, at 82 (asserting that the 
key to effective control is possession). 
 47. YEHUDA Z. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (1965) (quoting 
D.H.N. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 332, 345 
(1950)); see also HILL, supra note 7, at 146–49 (“Modern claims to terra nullius rely heavily on 
occupation.”); Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 30, at 714–16 (“[W]hen title to territory is 
contested, the single most important indicator of legal title to land is possession . . . .”). 
 48. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 1.4.2.1 (2001) (“It is 
often accurately said that ‘possession is nine-tenths of the law.’”). 
 49. Burghardt, supra note 16, at 228–29. 
 50. HILL, supra note 7, at 146. 
 51. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1483 (7th ed. 1999). 
 52. See HILL, supra note 7, at 146 (“[Discovery] came to be looked upon as, at the most, 
merely creating an inchoate title to be ‘consummated by possession’ . . . .” (quoting Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823))). 
 53. JENNINGS, supra note 7, at 30. 
 54. See BLUM, supra note 47, at 14–15, 51 (“[P]rescriptive rights [to territory] are acquired 
solely by adverse holding.”). 
 55. Id. at 7. 
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The effective control doctrine is not without problems, though. In 
particular, the lack of consensus on the applicable standards has 
resulted in many competing claims.56 Specifically, these claims have 
questioned the quantum of control required, as well as its quality—
namely, whether private actors can contribute to a state’s effective 
control of a territory. 
As to administration of the land, definitions vary, but the central 
issue is defining “the degree and kind of possession” from which title 
will issue.57 Professor Hill argues that, at its pinnacle, effective control 
is “the establishment of governmental control sufficient to provide 
security to life and property;”58 at a minimum, the “occupation must 
have been real or ‘effective.’ . . . [This condition is satisfied] when 
there is an announced intention to acquire, and actual settlement or 
occupation with the assertion of governmental authority has taken 
place.”59 Professor Burghardt states that administration must be 
continuous and occupation effective: “[I]deally, the territory should 
be settled throughout and the natural resources of the area should be 
developed and used.”60 Professor Yehuda Blum describes 
administration as the exercise of the appropriate amount of political, 
military, or administrative control under the circumstances and with 
the intention to govern the territory.61 Some commentators suggest 
that the longer the duration of the administration, the more 
substantial the justification for a territorial claim based on effective 
control.62 
 
 56. See infra Part II.  
 57. JENNINGS, supra note 7, at 20. 
 58. HILL, supra note 7, at 147. 
 59. Id. at 146–47; see Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 30, at 715–16 (“The state must engage 
in acts of jurisdiction that demonstrate its sovereignty over the territory; it must treat the area in 
question as its own.”). 
 60. Burghardt, supra note 16, at 229. 
 61. BLUM, supra note 47, at 101, 110, 118. 
 62. See HILL, supra note 7, at 156–57 (“[C]ontinuous and undisturbed exercise of 
sovereignty over it during such a period as is necessary to create under the influence of 
historical development the general conviction that the present condition of things is in 
conformity with international order.” (quoting L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 242 
(3d ed. 1920)); cf. BLUM, supra note 47, at 53–55 (“In all the cases where an historic title is 
asserted, the time factor fulfils the function that is usually assigned to express recognition or 
positive consent . . . .”). 
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F. History 
Historical claims to territory are based on historical priority (first 
possession) or duration (length of possession).63 Although effective 
control (possession) presents the strongest claim under property law, 
historical claims create an underlying entitlement to territory, 
regardless of whether a state has actual or constructive possession of 
the land at the time of the claim.64 Thus, historical claims tend to be 
most common, compared to the other claims discussed here.65 A claim 
of historic right is bolstered by the passage of time; when the 
encroached state does not act to counter the claimant’s right, it is 
deemed to have acquiesced in that right and is estopped from 
rejecting the title for lack of consent.66 Claims based on historical 
priority are most closely related to claims based on historic title 
because such titles are generally derived from first-in-time claims to 
land.67 
Historical claims often relate to cultural claims, because the 
greater the cultural importance of the territory, the stronger the 
 
 63. Burghardt, supra note 16, at 230. 
 64. See SHARMA, supra note 7, at 31 (“The most common way in which a historic claim is 
advanced is to refer to a set of historical facts to establish that they logically lead to a right to 
historic possession.”); Burghardt, supra note 16, at 230–33 (“Historical claims are greatly 
strengthened by duration, by the existence over a long period of time (preferably to the present 
day) of those features that form the basis of the claim.”). See generally Alexander B. Murphy, 
Historical Justifications for Territorial Claims, 80 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 531 
(1990) (“[J]ustifications now offered in support of territorial claims are almost invariably 
couched in terms of recovery of territory that historically belonged to the claiming state.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 36, at 73 (“Most conflict over territory is based on 
historical claims (some of which are quite dubious).”). 
 66. See BLUM, supra note 47, at 55, 90–91 (“[I]n certain situations one party’s failure to act 
or his acquiesence ‘will prejudice his rights against another who has been misled by that party’s 
inaction or silence.’” (quoting O.W. Bowett, Estoppel Before International Tribunals and Its 
Relation to Acquiescence, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 198 (1957))). In this respect, claims based on 
history and effective control can overlap. 
 67. See id. (“In all cases where an historic title is asserted, the time factor fulfils the 
function that is normally assigned to express recognition or positive consent . . . .”). Colonialism 
wholly rejected the validity of territorial claims based on priority and, in most cases, duration, as 
well. Historical claims to colonies by the colonial powers lay primarily in discovery, settlement, 
treaties with natives, and treaties among the colonizing nations to parse out their claimed 
territories in an organized fashion. HILL, supra note 7, at 90–91. Subsequent to the initial 
colonization, the powers claimed sovereignty over the colonies on historical grounds more than 
on grounds of effective control; in many cases, local control had been transferred to a select 
ruling class of the natives, and the locally based colonials were there for commercial, as opposed 
to administrative, purposes. See id. at 91 (discussing colonial powers’ competing claims over 
parts of Africa). 
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historical claim to it. Historical claims are strong when the territory in 
question is the claimant group’s homeland because that “includes 
both priority and duration and expresses the ultimate case of man-
land symbiosis.”68 The history of the people and their land “fleshes 
out the identity of the nation, reveals it as a community of fate, and 
gives it genetic legitimacy. It can be based on events that have 
actually taken place or on myths that were purposely constructed.”69 
The land and its inhabitants’ identities reinforce each other. 
G. Uti Possidetis 
Uti possidetis,70 a principle used to define postcolonial boundaries 
in Latin America, Asia, and Africa,71 is a doctrine under which newly 
independent states inherit the preindependence administrative 
boundaries set by the former colonial power.72 The doctrine posits 
that title to the colonial territory devolves to the local authorities73 
and prevails over any competing claim based on occupation.74 Thus, 
uti possidetis is predicated on a rejection of self-determination and 
assumes that internal, administrative boundaries are functionally 
 
 68. Burghardt, supra note 16, at 232; see also HOROWITZ, supra note 36, at 208 (“In 
general, the closer the identification of the group with the soil, the more powerful the 
pretension.”). See generally David H. Kaplan, Territorial Identities and Geographic Scale, in 
NESTED IDENTITIES: NATIONALISM, TERRITORY & SCALE, supra note 27, at 31 (“National 
identity . . . is bound up with the territory that helps define it . . . .”). 
 69. Herb, supra note 27, at 16. 
 70. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Uti possidetis originated in Roman law as a 
procedural rule that shifted the burden of proof to the party not holding the land. JOHN 
BASSETT MOORE, MEMORANDUM ON UTI POSSIDETIS 5–8 (1913). 
 71. See P. Mweti Munya, The International Court of Justice and Peaceful Settlement of 
African Disputes: Problems, Challenges and Prospects, 7 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 159, 215 (1998) 
(discussing how the ICJ has used uti possidetis to decide boundary disputes in Africa); Zacher, 
supra note 27, at 229–31 (describing the doctrine’s application in Latin America and Africa). See 
generally Thomas, supra note 25, at 87–99 (outlining problems with the stability of postcolonial 
borders in Africa, Asia, and Latin America). 
 72. See generally Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders 
of New States, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 590 (1996).  
 73. Simmons, supra note 32, at 4; Burghardt, supra note 16, at 229; see also HILL, supra 
note 7, at 154–56 (describing the doctrine’s development in Latin America). But see BLUM, 
supra note 47, at 341–42 (arguing that the principle of uti possidetis is ambiguous because there 
are differences of opinion as to whether it means actual or rightful possession at the time of 
independence). 
 74. See HILL, supra note 7, at 155 (“This doctrine established a rule that was to be regarded 
as superior to occupation.”); see also Zacher, supra note 27, at 221 (noting that, in the context of 
decolonization under the UN Charter, “[t]he colonial territory which was often artificial in 
terms of delimiting ethnic nations, became the frame of reference”). 
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equivalent to international boundaries.75 Commentators criticize uti 
possidetis because administrative colonial borders were almost always 
vaguely drawn76 and did not correspond to the inhabitant populations. 
Consequently, these commentators argue, reliance on uti possidetis 
has led to many border disputes.77 
H. Elitism 
Elitist claims to territory contend that a “particular minority has 
the right or duty to control certain territories.”78 Conquerors—who, 
historically, made such claims most frequently—often shaped them in 
terms of divine rights to rule certain territory.79 Such claims have 
become rarer over time because they “run counter to the democratic 
ideal.”80 Nevertheless, elitist claims have a modern and public 
incarnation in arguments for territory based on superior technological 
ability—a particular group claims control over a territory by virtue of 
having the capacity to develop the land’s potential most fully.81 Such 
claims are consistent with a labor theory of property law, which grants 
property rights to the person (or entity) investing labor in the land, 
thereby making it productive.82 But for the capable person’s labor or 
technological ability, the territory’s resources and potential would not 
be tapped. 
 
 75. Ratner, supra note 72, at 591. Professor Ratner contends that such boundaries are not 
functionally equivalent. See id. (“[A]pplication of uti possidetis to the breakup of states 
today . . . ignores critical distinctions between internal lines and international boundaries . . . .”). 
 76. See, e.g., CUKWURAH, supra note 7, at 114–15 (“In some areas . . . at the time of 
independence the colonial administrative authorities of a given political unit had been in fact 
exercising civil jurisdiction beyond the line designated, approximately at least, as the limit of 
their territorial jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 77. See HILL, supra note 7, at 24, 31, 155 (explaining that the application of uti possidetis 
has created unclear boundaries, resulting in many disputes in Latin America and Asia); see also 
Murphy, supra note 64, at 542 (discussing postcolonial interstate territorial conflicts in sub-
Saharan and West Africa). In attempting to resolve these disputes, cross-claimants have relied 
on old royal documents, decrees, and agreements as evidence to demonstrate the intention of 
the powers in dividing their colonial territories. CUKWURAH, supra note 7, at 115; HILL, supra 
note 7, at 155. 
 78. Burghardt, supra note 16, at 238. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 239. 
 82. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ¶ 27 (Richard H. Cox ed., 
Harlan Davidson 1982) (1690) (“Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath 
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, 
and thereby makes it his property.”); see also SINGER, supra note 48, § 1.4.2.2 (summarizing 
Locke’s labor theory). 
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I. Ideology 
Ideological justifications resemble claims of a “special mission” 
based in “[u]nique identification with the land” and having inherent 
“exclusivist overtones.”83 Thus, ideological justifications for territorial 
claims are more appropriately termed ideologically imperialist. Chief 
examples of this claim are the Crusades, the Ottoman Turks’ eastern 
advance, anticolonialism, and social justice,84 among others.85 The 
anticolonial ideological justification, which argues that colonial 
borders are per se inappropriate delimiters of territory for moral or 
legal reasons, is essentially the antithesis of a uti possidetis claim.86 
II.  EVOLUTION OF THE ICJ’S TERRITORIAL  
DISPUTE JURISPRUDENCE 
This Part uses the foregoing categories of justifications for 
territorial claims to analyze nine land disputes adjudicated by the ICJ. 
These cases are the only land boundary cases that the court has 
adjudicated. 
A. Minquiers and Ecrehos (France/United Kingdom) 
By special agreement,87 France and the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
submitted to the ICJ their dispute over the sovereignty of the 
Minquiers and Ecrehos island groups, located in the English Channel 
between Jersey (U.K.) and the French mainland.88 The parties made 
arguments based on treaty law, history, and effective control. 
The court rejected all arguments based on feudal land grants and 
fisheries agreements, all of which antedated 1648,89 because none 
 
 83. HOROWITZ, supra note 36, at 204. 
 84. Social justice here is “the right to obtain recompense for injustices and sufferings 
endured.” Burghardt, supra note 16, at 240. For example, after World War II, Ethiopia was 
awarded Eritrea, a former Italian colony, to compensate for Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia 
during the war. Id. See generally SINGER, supra note 48, § 1.4.1.1 (“Rights language, broadly 
conceived, includes any normative arguments that justify property regimes or rules because they 
are right—because they describe ways in which people should behave toward each other.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 85. Burghardt, supra note 16, at 239–40; see also HILL, supra note 7, at 141 (discussing the 
German colonial claims during and after World War I). 
 86. Burghardt, supra note 16, at 239–40. 
 87. For an explanation of special agreements, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 88. Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17). 
 89. The Peace of Westphalia, defining the modern interstate system, was agreed to in 1648. 
See Treaty of Westphalia, Oct. 24, 1648, available at 
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specified a border or “which islands were held by the Kings of 
England and France respectively.”90 Judge Basdevant, writing a 
separate opinion, concurred: “Suzerainty . . . is not sovereignty,” 
noting the important distinction that the court implicitly made in 
dismissing claims based ambiguously on feudal titles.91 
In the absence of a valid treaty claim, the court considered the 
effective control arguments and found that the British government 
exercised sovereign jurisdiction and local administration over 
Minquiers and Ecrehos through such acts as judicial proceedings, 
local ordinances regarding the handling of corpses, levying taxes, 
licensing commercial boats, registering deeds to real property, and 
conducting census enumerations and customs affairs.92 Thus, the court 
awarded the territory to the United Kingdom.93 
B. Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium/Netherlands) 
The Kingdoms of Belgium and of the Netherlands submitted a 
frontier dispute to the ICJ by special agreement that charged the 
court with deciding which party had sovereignty over certain border 
plots.94 The disputed border was marked by several enclaves around 
Baerle-Duc, a Belgian commune, and Baarle-Nassau, a Dutch 
commune.95 The parties made claims based on treaties and effective 
control. 
The court held that the parties’ 1843 Boundary Convention 
established the border, and that the disputed plots were Belgian.96 
This holding stemmed from the evolution of previous bilateral 
treaties between Belgium and the Netherlands.97 One treaty was the 
1842 Boundary Treaty, which charged a Mixed Boundary 
Commission with defining the border by maintaining the 
administrative status quo.98 The commission’s work resulted in the 
 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm (the Treaty ended the Eighty Years’ War and 
part of the Thirty Years’ War). 
 90. Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. at 54. 
 91. Id. at 75.  
 92. Id. at 65–69. 
 93. Id. at 72. 
 94. Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg./Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209, 210–11, 212 
(June 20). The disputed plots amounted to a total area of 14.378 hectares. Id. at 233.  
 95. Id. at 212–13. 
 96. Id. at 222. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 214. 
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1843 Boundary Convention, which, in an annexed document, 
provided that the plots were part of Baerle-Duc.99 The court 
considered the commission’s product dispositive because the 
commission derived its mandate from the 1839 Treaty of London, 
which made Belgium and the Netherlands separate kingdoms.100 
The court rejected the Dutch claim that the 1843 Boundary 
Convention did not reflect the common intention of the parties and 
was therefore void under the doctrine of mistake.101 The court also 
rejected the Dutch contention that acts of sovereignty exercised in the 
disputed plots extinguished any Belgian title thereto.102 The court 
aptly stated the issue as follows: 
This is a claim to sovereignty in derogation of title established by 
treaty. Under the Boundary Convention, sovereignty resided in 
Belgium. The question for the Court is whether Belgium has lost its 
sovereignty, by non-assertion of its rights and by acquiescence in 
acts of sovereignty alleged to have been exercised by the 
Netherlands at different times since 1843.103 
The court found that Belgium had not ceased to assert its rights and 
that the Netherlands’ encroachments were insufficient to supplant 
Belgian sovereignty for two reasons.104 First, the encroaching acts 
were “largely of a routine and administrative character performed by 
local officials and a consequence of the inclusion by the Netherlands 
of the disputed plots in its Survey.”105 Second, the plots were enclaves 
in the Netherlands, making it difficult for Belgium to detect these 
encroachments upon its sovereignty and exercise its own authority 
over the plots.106 The court thus awarded the territory to Belgium.107 
 
 99. Id. at 214–16. 
 100. Id. at 221. 
 101. Id. at 227. The doctrine of mistake annuls a contract when, because the parties did not 
assent to the same proposition, there is no meeting of the minds. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 18, 
at 140. 
 102. Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land, 1959 I.C.J. at 230. 
 103. Id. at 227. 
 104. Id. at 229. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 230. 
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C. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) 
Cambodia brought this action against Thailand for infringing its 
territorial sovereignty over the land surrounding the ruins of the 
Temple of Preah Vihear.108 Thailand denied all violations of 
Cambodian sovereignty, claiming that the ruins were on its side of the 
common border.109 The parties made claims based on treaties, 
effective control, history, geography, and culture. 
The Temple, an “ancient sanctuary and shrine” of “considerable 
artistic and archaeological interest,” sat on the Thai side of the 
countries’ common border, on an escarpment that jutted into the 
Cambodian plain.110 The dispute focused on a 1904 boundary treaty in 
which France and Siam (as Thailand was then called) established the 
border that later separated Cambodia and Thailand.111 Thailand 
asserted its own claim to the Temple land on the theory that 
Cambodia could have no territorial sovereignty over land on the Thai 
side of the border.112 
The court rejected the Thai argument because maps drawn when 
the border was delimited, coupled with French and Siamese reliance 
on these maps, indicated that the entire Preah Vihear region was 
located in what became Cambodia.113 The 1904 French-Siamese 
boundary treaty substantiated the Cambodian claim to sovereignty 
over the Temple land.114 That treaty, according to the court, 
established the watershed line as the border but rested ultimate 
authority to draw the border with the Mixed Boundary 
Commission.115 In tandem with drawing the border, the commission 
had authority to map the entire region, which it delegated, with the 
consent of the Siamese commission representatives, to French 
officers.116 The French officers mapped the area and placed the 
Temple in French Indochina.117 Neither France nor Siam ever 
formally adopted these maps, but each country implicitly accepted 
 
 108. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 9 (June 15). 
 109. Id. at 14. 
 110. Id. at 15. 
 111. Id. at 16. 
 112. Id. at 14. 
 113. Id. at 17. 
 114. Id. at 20–21. 
 115. Id. at 17. 
 116. Id. at 20, 32–33. 
 117. Id. at 20–21. 
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them.118 This implicit acceptance of maps showing the Temple in what 
became Cambodia substantiated Cambodia’s claim against Thailand. 
The maps derived their importance from their mandate in the 1904 
boundary treaty, and the borders that they reflected devolved to 
Cambodia and Thailand under uti possidetis. 
The court also rejected Thailand’s effective control claims by 
which it had asserted that acts subsequent to the 1904 treaty 
manifested its exercise of sovereignty.119 Thailand’s administrative 
acts were conducted by local authorities, were “very few [and] 
routine,” and did not suffice to annul “the clear impression of 
acceptance of the frontier line at Preah Vihear.”120 When Siam openly 
flouted French (and later, Cambodian) sovereignty in the disputed 
area, the latter replied through diplomatic channels, reaffirming its 
rights, to engage Thailand in dialogue. The court found this evidence 
of continued French and Cambodian jurisdiction over the Temple 
persuasive.121 
By relying on the maps produced by the 1904 boundary treaty, 
the court dismissed as legally indecisive all arguments of a “physical, 
historical, religious [or] archeological character.”122 This was 
tantamount to a rejection of these factors as “incidental equitable 
considerations.”123 
 
 118. Id. at 23. 
 119. Id. at 27–29. 
 120. Id. at 30. 
 121. Id. at 31–32. 
 122. Id. at 15. 
 123. MIYOSHI, supra note 13, at 114: 
[B]asically whatever one does—feasance or nonfeasance—can have a cultural 
background, and consequently can be treated in a discriminatory way under the rules 
of procedure if these are not a fair representation of “the main forms of civilization 
and of the principal legal systems of the world.” If, therefore, an act or omission at 
issue is of such a basic nature as to reflect inherent cultural values, it may require 
some special consideration, rather than a mere consideration as a relevant 
circumstance. 
Id. at 207 (quoting ICJ Statute, supra note 8, art. 9, 59 Stat. at 1056). Based on the court’s 
holding, it might appear that the justifications less legal in nature (i.e., geography, culture, 
history, economy, ideology, and elitism) are mere straw men in this Note, but it would be error 
to dismiss them so quickly. Many states—some more persuasively than others—make legal 
arguments based on these justifications, cast in terms of property rights based on personality 
theory. For an articulation of the personality theory of property, see SINGER, supra  
note 48, § 1.4.1.3. 
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D. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) 
By special agreement, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Mali 
submitted a boundary dispute to the court for adjudication in 1983.124 
The special agreement identified the disputed territory as a strip of 
land containing a temporary watercourse that was important for 
agriculture and grazing in the Dori region around the Béli River.125 
The region was formerly part of French West Africa, and 
decolonization led to competing land claims when the land was 
divided into independent states in 1960.126 The parties made claims 
based on treaty law and effective control.127 
The court dismissed assertions of sovereignty and exercises of 
administrative control as immaterial.128 Instead, the case turned on the 
location of boundaries at various critical dates under French colonial 
law.129 Colonial effectivités130 can “support an existing title” if they can 
be “compared with the title in question.”131 Here, no such title existed, 
so the French colonial effectivités could not alone delimit the border. 
Consequently, the court set the border at Burkina Faso’s 1932 
borders insofar as those limits were ascertainable from the evidence. 
This border was based on uti possidetis, as France, in 1947, set the 
border at its December 1932 limits, which included the former colony 
Upper Volta.132 
Thereafter, the court essentially halved the disputed territory, in 
recognition of inconsistencies and gaps in the record.133 When such 
inconsistencies or gaps existed, the court proceeded in equity, 
dividing the disputed territory in half.134 Nevertheless, the court was 
 
 124. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 556–57 (Dec. 22). 
 125. Id. at 562; BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 105 (Alan Day ed., 2d ed. 1987). 
 126. Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. at 570.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Effectivités are administrative activities that demonstrate jurisdiction over territory; 
most frequently, they include deed registration, tax collection, and licensing of professions. See 
id. at 586. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 586–87.  
 133. See id. at 583–87. 
 134. Id. at 632, 640–41, 647. 
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barred from deciding the case ex aequo et bono135 because the parties 
had not consented to this.136 Equity infra legem—equity used as a 
“method of interpret[ing] . . . the law in force”—guided the court 
instead.137 
E. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/ 
Honduras: Nicaragua Intervening) 
El Salvador and Honduras brought this case by special 
agreement in 1986,138 charging the court with delimiting a boundary 
line that constituted two-thirds of the 343-kilometer border between 
El Salvador and Honduras.139 The disputed boundary consisted of 
land that the parties’ 1980 General Treaty of Peace between the two 
parties failed to describe.140 Additionally, the countries asked the 
court to determine the status of a number of islands and maritime 
spaces in the Gulf of Fonseca.141 The parties made arguments based 
on treaties, elitism, economics, history, and effective control. 
The court grounded its decision in uti possidetis,142 when possible, 
and relied otherwise on postcolonial effective control and possession. 
The most persuasive evidence in this analysis was documentation and 
manifestations of state action from the colonial period.143 
Additionally, the court rested on equity infra legem when 
irreconcilable evidence undermined both countries’ claims.144 
 
 135. The parties’ special agreement governed the scope of the court’s review under Article 
38 of the court’s Statute and did not permit review ex aequo et bono. See supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. 
 136. See Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. at 567 (“It is clear that the Chamber cannot decide ex 
aequo et bono in this case.”). 
 137. Id. at 567–68.  
 138. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 
I.C.J. 351, 356 (Sept. 11). Nicaragua, as an interested third party, intervened in the proceedings 
with respect to maritime issues. This Note considers only the land and island disputes. 
 139. Id. at 357; BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note 125, at 425. 
 140. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 I.C.J. at 356. 
 141. Id. at 351. 
 142. Id. at 391–92. 
 143. See id. at 417 (considering each party’s interpretation of a 1776 title survey); id. at 423–
24 (referencing a 1935 agreement between El Salvador and Honduras that established a border 
between the two countries); id. at 434–35 (referring to the issuance by Honduras of three titles 
to land in dispute); id. at 465 (granting weight to a 1742 title document and to 1766 and 1786 
surveys); id. at 469 (basing a boundary decision on two titles); id. at 486 (noting that El Salvador 
relied on borders established in 1815 by a decree of the Real Audiencia); id. at 510 (relying on 
surveyor results that both parties had approved previously). 
 144. Id. at 514. For a definition of equity infra legem, see text accompanying note 137. 
SUMNER FINISHED.DOC 2/9/2005 11:06 AM 
2004] TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 1799 
Significantly, in reaching its decision the court rejected all claims 
based on terra nullius145 and historic titles predating the parties’ 1821 
independence.146 The court did not resort to competing historic claims 
based on priority, which meant that the location of the Spanish 
provincial boundaries was dispositive in the land frontier 
determination—uti possidetis controlled. 
The special agreement invoked the 1980 General Treaty of 
Peace, which allowed the parties to admit a broad scope of evidence 
in disputes arising under the treaty.147 However, the majority of this 
evidence did not influence the court’s analysis. For instance, the court 
dismissed evidence of El Salvador’s high population density, which 
supported El Salvador’s elitist claim, and of the economic necessity of 
the land to El Salvador.148 Instead, the court conducted an effective 
control analysis because Spanish boundaries were practically 
nonexistent and evidence about historic events was inconclusive.149 It 
focused this analysis on postcolonial possession and jurisdiction as 
indicators of the parties’ perceptions about the limits of their 
territorial sovereignty.150 The court considered two factors to 
determine whether either party acquiesced in the control of the 
islands by the other party—one, the parties’ conduct after 
independence as a proxy for the situation in 1821, and, two, the 
parties’ more recent conduct.151 Given that the islands were left 
unoccupied for many years after independence because they had little 
economic value,152 the court held that even after many years of lack of 
possession, later “[p]ossession backed by the exercise of sovereignty 
[could] be taken as evidence confirming the uti possidetis juris title.”153 
The court therefore awarded the islands to whichever party had 
exercised postcolonial effective control. 
 
 145. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (defining terra nullius). 
 146. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 I.C.J. at 544. 
 147. Id. at 357–58. 
 148. Id. at 396–97. 
 149. Id. at 563. 
 150. Id. at 558. 
 151. Id. at 563. 
 152. Id. at 565. 
 153. Id. 
SUMNER FINISHED.DOC 2/9/2005 11:06 AM 
1800 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1779 
F. Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) 
Libya and Chad submitted a dispute over the Aozou Strip to the 
court in 1990.154 The conflict began in 1973 when Libya’s Colonel 
Mohammar Qaddafi annexed the strip of land—a purported source 
for uranium—in northern Chad.155 The parties made arguments based 
on treaty law, uti possidetis, ideology, and elitism. 
The court rejected Libya’s argument that the 1955 Treaty of 
Friendship and Good Neighbourliness did not establish a boundary 
between the two countries, finding that, when interpreted in good 
faith with ordinary meanings imputed to its terms, the 1955 Treaty 
left no boundaries undefined.156 The court confirmed this reading by 
consulting the Treaty’s travaux préparatoires, which indicated clearly 
that Libya understood that the boundaries were set.157 The 1955 
Treaty encompassed by reference and inclusion in pendant annexes 
several antecedent agreements that codified the international 
boundaries.158 Because the court affirmed the validity and scope of the 
1955 Treaty, the court applied the boundaries as prescribed in the 
annexed agreements.159 
The court further held that, because the 1955 Treaty was clear on 
the boundary question, it was unnecessary for the court to consider 
uti possidetis, title inherited from indigenous peoples (a Libyan 
ideological claim160), or spheres of influence (a Libyan elitist claim).161 
The court therefore ruled in favor of Chad.162 
G. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain) 
In 1991, Qatar instituted proceedings against Bahrain before the 
ICJ to resolve a dispute about sovereignty over the land chunk 
Zubarah, the Hawar Islands, and the island Janan, all located 
 
 154. Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 8–9 (Feb. 3). 
 155. BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note 125, at 113–14. 
 156. Territorial Dispute, 1994 I.C.J. at 21–26. 
 157. Id. at 27–28. 
 158. Id. at 28–33. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 12–13. 
 161. Id. at 38–40. 
 162. Id. at 40. 
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between the Qatari peninsula and Bahrain.163 The history of Bahrain 
and Qatar, both former British protectorates, figured prominently in 
the dispute.164 Qatar and Bahrain made arguments based on uti 
possidetis, effective control, history, and geography. 
The court found Bahrain’s arguments as to sovereignty over 
Zubarah untenable on all counts.165 For one, it deemed Bahrain’s 
exercises of sovereign activity piracy, meaning that they could not 
create a legitimate claim to territorial sovereignty.166 Moreover, the 
court found persuasive evidence of the parties’ shared understanding 
that Qatar’s predecessors in interest would govern the entire Qatari 
peninsula, including Zubarah,167 reflected in long-standing Qatari 
settlements in Zubarah.168 
As to the Hawar Islands, the court rejected Qatar’s claim not to 
have consented to the 1939 British decision that the islands were part 
of Bahrain, finding it dispositive that both parties had pled their cases 
before the British authorities.169 The court therefore declined to 
consider Qatar’s arguments based on colonial effectivités,170 original 
title, and geographic proximity. Because the court found the British 
decision dispositive,171 it did not consider Bahrain’s effective control 
argument.  
The court also found the United Kingdom’s 1939 award 
dispositive as to sovereignty over Janan Island; that award, as 
interpreted by the British government in 1947, indicated that Janan 
Island was part of Qatar.172 So holding, the court discounted Bahrain’s 
argument that it effectively controlled the Island. 
 
 163. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 40, 44, 
49–50 (Mar. 16). This Note considers only the question of sovereignty over the islands, insofar 
as that question is conceptually distinct from the maritime delimitation. 
 164. See id. at 54–64 (describing the history of the dispute). 
 165. Id. at 69. 
 166. Id. at 67. 
 167. Id. at 68. 
 168. See id. at 67–68 (citing agreements dating back to 1913). 
 169. Id. at 83–84. 
 170. Id. at 85. 
 171. Id. at 83–84. 
 172. Id. at 90–91. 
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H. Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea Intervening) 
In 1994 Cameroon lodged proceedings against Nigeria, focusing 
generally on sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula and the Lake 
Chad region.173 Underlying this dispute were two 1961 regional 
plebiscites that provided for the annexation of the disputed territory 
by Cameroon. Despite the plebiscites, the annexation never occurred 
because of a minority population in the disputed region that did not 
wish to be incorporated into Cameroon.174 Before the ICJ, the parties 
made arguments based on treaties, history, effective control, and uti 
possidetis. 
The court resolved the parties’ treaty and uti possidetis 
arguments by looking to preindependence colonial actions. The court 
found that the 1929–1930 Thomson-Marchand Declaration, to which 
the United Kingdom and France had agreed, made a detailed 
delimitation of the interstate border.175 The court found particularly 
persuasive the United Nations Trusteeships over Nigeria and 
Cameroon after World War II, which explicitly referred to the 
Thomson-Marchand Declaration and to the 1931 Henderson-Fleuriau 
exchange of diplomatic notes that made the Declaration an 
international agreement at law.176 Similarly, the subsequent work of 
the Lake Chad Basin Commission strongly indicated that the 
Declaration had defined the disputed frontier, rejecting Nigeria’s 
claim to the contrary.177 
The court wholly rejected Nigeria’s historical consolidation of 
title argument, holding that it could not “replace the established 
modes of acquisition of title under international law, which take into 
account many other important variables of fact and law.”178 The court 
also reaffirmed its holding in Frontier Dispute that effective control 
through effectivités are subsidiary to and unable to supersede a 
 
 173. Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nig.: Eq. Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 
303, 342–44 (Oct. 10). This Note does not consider the maritime boundary question, on which 
Equatorial Guinea intervened. 
 174. BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note 125, at 111. 
 175. Land and Maritime Boundary, 2002 I.C.J. at 340. 
 176. Id. at 341. 
 177. See id. at 342–44 (describing the work of the Commission). 
 178. Id. at 352. 
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conventional title.179 The court thus awarded the territory to 
Cameroon.180 
I. Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 
(Indonesia/Malaysia) 
In 1998 Indonesia and Malaysia, by special agreement, asked the 
ICJ “to determine on the basis of the treaties, agreements and any 
other evidence furnished by the Parties” sovereignty over the islands 
of Ligitan and Sipadan, off the coast of Borneo.181 The parties 
presented arguments based on treaty law, uti possidetis, effective 
control, and history. 
The court began its analysis with the 1891 British-Dutch 
Convention and found that it did not address the boundary in 
question.182 Lacking a treaty law basis for its decision, the court turned 
first to subsequent agreements between Great Britain and the 
Netherlands, and then to the parties’ subsequent practice, in an 
unsuccessful attempt to understand the parties’ mutual intent.183 The 
court then examined the competing claims of effectivités as an 
independent basis for the judgment184 and held that Indonesia’s 
claimed effectivités were not of a “legislative or regulatory character,” 
rendering them unpersuasive.185 The court considered, however, that 
Malaysia’s regulation of the commercial collection of turtle eggs and 
establishment of a bird sanctuary on the islands were sufficiently 
administrative to demonstrate effective control.186 The court thus 
found the effectivités arguments a sufficient basis for its decision.187 
III.  THE ICJ’S HIERARCHICAL DECISION RULE 
This Part argues that the court, in analyzing the competing claims 
for sovereignty involved in territorial disputes, applies a tripartite, 
hierarchical decision rule that looks first to treaty law, then to uti 
 
 179. Id. at 353. 
 180. Id. at 355. 
 181. Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 625, 
630 (Dec. 17). 
 182. Id. at 652–53. 
 183. Id. at 653–56. 
 184. Id. at 678. 
 185. Id. at 683. 
 186. Id. at 684. 
 187. Id. at 674–78. 
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possidetis, and finally to effective control. This Part first analyzes the 
court’s territorial dispute jurisprudence and then discusses the 
implications of the court’s decision rule. 
A. Analysis of the Court’s Territorial Dispute Jurisprudence 
The existence of a prior boundary treaty or other documentation 
reflecting interstate agreement as to boundaries (or provisions for 
their delimitation) is generally dispositive for the court. This rule 
often holds even when an agreement is unclear or incomplete. In 
cases when state consent is evident, the court has started and ended 
its legal analysis with the agreement.188 For instance, in Territorial 
Dispute (Libya/Chad),189 the court decided the case solely on the basis 
of treaty law, discounting all other arguments completely.190 
Furthermore, the court was unwilling to question the merits of the 
1955 Treaty, which was not as clear as the court portrayed it. The 
court justified its decision, in part, by Libya’s being a party to the 
treaty (as opposed to the successor in interest to a colonial power).191 
To question the substance of the treaty would be tantamount to 
questioning the parties’ expressed preferences and thwarting the 
parties’ and other states’ reliance on the agreed terms of the treaty. 
When no international agreement exists, however, the next most 
dispositive basis for a judgment is uti possidetis, if applicable.192 It is 
unlikely that a decision would rest on uti possidetis alone, because 
almost all colonial boundaries were codified in some kind of 
instrument. In cases of internal boundaries, however, there may only 
be domestic understandings, accepted practices, or documentation on 
the local level. For instance, in Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), 
the court depended on the borders as they existed under French 
colonial law.193 
In cases that do not concern postcolonial borders and that lack 
manifest consent as to borders, the court is most likely to base its 
decision on effective control.194 In such cases, the duration and degree 
 
 188. See supra notes 96–100, 114–18, 156–59, 175–77 and accompanying text. 
 189. Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3). 
 190. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.  
 191. Territorial Dispute, 1994 I.C.J. at 38. 
 192. See supra notes 118, 129, 142, 170–72 and accompanying text.  
 193. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra notes 92, 102–04, 142–43, 149–53, 179, 186 and accompanying text; cf. supra 
notes 119–21, 165–67, 184–85 and accompanying text (rejecting effective control claims). 
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of the control are the most important considerations because they 
make public the claimant state’s exercise of the right. In Minquiers 
and Ecrehos, for example, the court’s holding depended on the 
exercise of local administration.195 In this respect, a decision based on 
solid effective control is analogous to a common law property award 
based on adverse possession, whereby the claimant’s possession must 
be actual, open and notorious, exclusive, continuous, adverse or 
hostile, and extant for a certain period of time.196 Although the 
international formulation is somewhat different, effective control 
claims are also based in law.197 When the party whose territory is 
encroached in this manner acquiesces in the encroachment, the claim 
is bolstered, as in a common law adverse possession claim. 
In Minquiers and Ecrehos, the court focused on acts of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction, whereas in Sovereignty over Certain 
Frontier Land (Belgium/Netherlands) and Land and Maritime 
Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria), the court almost wholly dismissed 
such acts, relying instead on treaties and agreements. This ruling was 
especially significant in the latter case because the treaty, as the court 
acknowledged, was imperfect and did not resolve all boundary 
issues.198 Nonetheless, the imperfect agreement overrode a wealth of 
Nigerian circumstantial evidence on effective control of the disputed 
territory.199 
The distinction between Minquiers and Ecrehos on the one hand, 
and Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land and Land and Maritime 
Boundary on the other, is an important one. Much of the legal 
literature on territorial disputes focuses on title by acts of sovereignty 
and acquiescence by the opposing party. However, in Sovereignty 
over Certain Frontier Land,200 and Land and Maritime Boundary, 
however, the court based its decisions squarely on treaty law, not on 
effective control.201 In Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land, 
Belgium had the clear treaty right, whereas the Netherlands had clear 
 
 195. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 196. SINGER, supra note 48, § 4.2. 
 197. HILL, supra note 7, at 146–49. The doctrine of acquisition by effective control is a 
general principle of law because it is a prerequisite for title. Burghardt, supra note 16, at 228. It 
is also one of the five traditional modes of territorial acquisition. JENNINGS, supra note 7, at 20. 
 198. Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nig.: Eq. Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 
303, 340–41 (Oct. 10).  
 199. Id. at 352–53. 
 200. Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg./Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209, 222 (June 20). 
 201. Land and Maritime Boundary, 2002 I.C.J. at 399. 
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effective control of the disputed territory.202 In resolving this tension, 
the court created a hierarchy of justifications in cases of this nature.203 
Land and Maritime Boundary further reinforces this hierarchy, 
because the court based the core of its decision on an international 
agreement fixing the border and held that effective control through 
effectivités was subsidiary to any such agreement.204 
The court has also demonstrated a preference for effective 
control justification over equity infra legem. In Sovereignty over Pulau 
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), the court went to 
great lengths to decide the case on the exercise of effectivités on the 
disputed islands. In the end it based its decision upon the fact that 
Malaysia regulated the collection of turtle eggs and established a bird 
sanctuary205—hardly analogous to the level of local administration in 
Minquiers and Ecrehos. The court was more willing to base its 
decision on evidence of effective control, though, than to resort to 
equity infra legem or any other decision rule.206 
When the court lacks guidance from treaties, uti possidetis, or 
effective control, it is most likely to proceed in equity infra legem and 
halve the difference between the litigants’ positions.207 The court—
somewhat ironically—prefers prescribing an equitable solution over 
entertaining justifications based on geography,208 economics,209 
  
 
 202. Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land, 1959 I.C.J. at 227. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Land and Maritime Boundary, 2002 I.C.J. at 353. 
 205. Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 625, 
684–86 (Dec. 17). 
 206. See id. at 674–78 (rejecting historic title arguments). 
 207. See, e.g., Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 567–68 (Dec. 22) (“It is 
clear that the Chamber . . . . will have regard to equity infra legem, that is, that form of equity 
which constitutes a method of interpretation of the law in force, and is one of its attributes.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 
40, 85 (Mar. 16) (declining to engage in a discussion of the merits of the parties’ geographic 
claims); Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 15 (June 15) (same). 
 209. See, e.g., Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. 
intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 396 (Sept. 11) (“[E]conomic considerations . . . could not be taken 
into account for the delimitation of the continental shelf areas appertaining to two States; still 
less can they be relevant for the determination of a land frontier which came into existence on 
independence.”(citation omitted)). 
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culture,210 history,211 elitism,212 or ideology.213 
That these categories do not form part of the court’s tripartite 
hierarchy merits some further discussion. Though claimants 
sometimes raise geography, this issue is conspicuously absent from 
the court’s holdings. In Temple of Preah Vihear, for example, the 
territory in question formed an escarpment—clearly separable from 
the plains below the mountain range—and the boundary was 
intended to follow a watershed line. But this ostensibly natural 
frontier was irrelevant to the court.214 
On the single occasion—in Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras)—when a claimant raised economics, 
the court quickly dismissed the claim.215 This is unsurprising, however, 
given the manner in which El Salvador cast its argument.216 Culture 
was also directly referenced only once—in Temple of Preah Vihear. 
Although it may be unsurprising that the cultural importance of the 
Temple did not figure into the court’s decision rule, it is somewhat 
surprising that the court did not engage in further discussion of that 
consideration,217 given its great significance to the litigants (as 
reflected in the extent to which they briefed their cultural arguments). 
It is noteworthy that, in Minquiers and Ecrehos, the parties did not 
present evidence as to what nationality the inhabitants of the 
Minquiers and Ecrehos groups considered themselves. In no way was 
self-determination or culture a factor in the court’s decision. 
Of the categories not part of the court’s rule of decision, history 
was raised most frequently. History also constitutes the most 
surprising omission from the court’s hierarchy, because titles and 
other historic information in support of territorial claims have 
traditionally been very prominent in the international territorial 
 
 210. See, e.g., Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J. at 16 (dismissing arguments of “historical, 
religious [or] archaelogical character”). 
 211. See, e.g., id. at 15 (“The Parties have also relied on other arguments of a . . . 
historical . . . character, but the Court is unable to regard them as legally decisive.”). 
 212. See, e.g., Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 I.C.J. at 396 (“[P]ost- 
independence effectivités, where relevant, have to be assessed in terms of actual events, not their 
social origins.”). 
 213. Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 12–13 (Feb. 3). 
 214. See supra notes 110 and 115 and accompanying text.  
 215. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 I.C.J. at 396. 
 216. El Salvador essentially argued that it was poor and needed the territory for economic 
exploitation. Id. 
 217. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 16 (June 15). 
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dispute literature. In fact, the court could have reasoned through the 
historic data proffered in Minquiers and Ecrehos to reach a decision, 
given that the parties presented ample evidence on feudal title.218 In 
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), 
ancient titles and other such documentation were not particularly 
helpful, especially when the parties to the dispute were not parties to 
the ancient titles.219 
B. Implications of the ICJ’s Jurisprudence 
The tripartite hierarchy that the court has adopted for territorial 
dispute cases is significant in two key respects: first, it depends on an 
expansive reading of treaty law; and second, the court imputes more 
legal weight to the uti possidetis principle than this principle may 
merit. 
First, the court’s hierarchy presupposes a broad reading of treaty 
law. In the most limited sense, treaties are mere contracts between 
states.220 In their broadest sense, they are aspirational statements 
about how the world should work.221 In between these two extremes, 
treaties might constitute legislation or constitutions.222 The court’s use 
of treaties in its international land dispute jurisprudence favors both a 
contractual and an aspirational role for treaties in international law. 
Viewing treaties as contracts, the court employs them to reflect 
mutual consent as to the disputed boundaries. So used, a treaty 
supersedes all other possible justifications for a territorial claim 
because it is the most direct expression of both parties’ wishes with 
respect to the disputed land. Such was the case in Sovereignty over 
Certain Frontier Land.223 
However, the court also uses treaties to resolve disputes even 
when neither party to an original treaty is a litigant before the court—
for example, in cases involving uti possidetis, such as Land and 
Maritime Boundary. This suggests that treaties may have an 
 
 218. Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 54 (Nov. 17). 
 219. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 I.C.J. at 544. 
 220. See JANIS, supra note 14, at 13–14 (“As international contract or traité-contrat, a treaty 
may simply accomplish some exchange or concession.”). 
 221. See id. at 14 (citing the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact as an example of an aspirational 
treaty). 
 222. Id. 
 223. See Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg./Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209, 221–22 (June 
20) (finding that the 1843 Boundary Convention “represent[ed] the common intention of the 
two States”). 
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aspirational legal force: they provide notice and, as an easily provable 
and readily available source of law, facilitate compliance.224 
Second, the court places greater legal weight to the uti possidetis 
principle than it may merit. By extending colonial powers’ boundary 
agreements to newly independent, postcolonial states, the court may 
tacitly have elevated uti possidetis to the status of customary 
international law or made it a general principle of international law,225 
even though it has never acknowledged as much. 
IV.  EVALUATION OF THE HIERARCHY 
This Part offers three potential explanations for the court’s 
hierarchy in addressing boundary disputes. An exhaustive analysis of 
these explanations is beyond the scope of this Note and is best left to 
future research. 
First, the court may favor a decision rule that ensures stable 
borders by protecting states’ harmonized expectations about border 
placement. The ICJ, by systematically basing decisions on 
international treaties, may be attempting to restore predictability and 
stability to the international system in territorial disputes. However, 
the evidence that this practice would, in fact, render the relationship 
more stable is unimpressive. 
 
 224. One of the benefits of treaties is that third parties can “observe their content with 
relative ease.” Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. 
L. REV. 1823, 1873 (2002). 
 225. There is some debate as to whether the uti possidetis principle is customary 
international law or a general principle of international law. Although many states have used 
the uti possidetis model to define postcolonial boundaries, Ratner, supra note 72, at 598–601, 
there are few, if any, indications that these states did so out of legal obligation (i.e., the 
requirement of opinio juris for a customary norm), id. at 598. The ICJ has, in dictum, indicated 
that uti possidetis might be a “general principle” of international law but has never held so 
explicitly. See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 556–57 (Dec. 22) (“Although 
there is no need, for the purposes of the present case, to show that [uti possidetis] is a firmly 
established principle of international law where decolonization is concerned, the Chamber 
nonetheless wishes to emphasize its general scope in view of its exceptional importance for the 
African continent . . . .”). Nevertheless, different, noncolonial borders frequently emerge after 
independence and after postindependence border disputes. Ratner, supra note 72, at 599–600. It 
appears, then, that uti possidetis is a customary practice but not an international legal norm. This 
affects the principle’s place in the ICJ’s hierarchy: lacking status as a rule of customary 
international law or general principle of law, uti possidetis should be only as persuasive as so-
called political (i.e., nonlegal) justifications for territorial claims. See, e.g., JENNINGS, supra note 
7, at 69–87 (exploring and describing the differences between legal and political claims). That is, 
uti possidetis would not fall within one of the sources of authority in Article 38 of the ICJ 
Statute. 
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Treaties are breached rather frequently, especially when they 
lack strong enforcement provisions.226 Most boundary treaties 
appearing in the ICJ’s jurisprudence have lacked such provisions. So, 
the ICJ would have limited power to stop, for example, an irredentist 
war in contravention of international law, especially when the stakes 
in such a conflict go to the heart of the aggressor’s culture or history, 
as many territorial disputes do. In other words, simply because a 
treaty sets a particular boundary, the area around the boundary does 
not necessarily become more stable.227 
Similarly, the application of uti possidetis does not inevitably 
make for a more predictable and stable system. For example, it is 
generally thought that subregional ethnic violence is the greatest 
threat to international peace and security since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union—the history of Yugoslavia after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain is a principal example.228 To be sure, uti possidetis was more 
successful in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, but even there the 
doctrine did not resolve the underlying territorial disputes; it merely 
delayed their surfacing.229 
The application of the doctrine of acquisition by effective control 
is even more unpredictable than uti possidetis; moreover, effective 
control is subject to abuse. In fact, because it is a general principle of 
law, it might—in a worst-case scenario—encourage territorial 
imperialism and a new wave of colonialism. 
Second, the court may have a preference for contract-based 
justifications over property law-based justifications. This Note 
explained in Part III.B how the preference for treaty-based 
justifications manifests a predisposition to contract claims.230 After 
evaluating any treaty law claims, the court proceeds to whether uti 
possidetis applies. Modern uti possidetis is a hybrid contract-property 
justification: it is analogous to property theory in that the newly 
 
 226. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to 
Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002) (describing why 
treaties often lack mandatory dispute resolution clauses). 
 227. This is, of course, at the heart of a multiyear debate in international relations theory. 
For a legal take on some of the core issues of the debate, see generally Guzman, supra note 224. 
 228. Ratner, supra note 72, at 590. 
 229. Consider, for example, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, supra notes 138–53 
and accompanying text, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions, supra notes 163–72 
and accompanying text, and Land and Maritime Boundary, supra notes 173–80 and 
accompanying text. 
 230. See supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text. 
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independent colonized peoples have had possession (albeit without 
corresponding jurisdiction) for some time, and analogous to contract 
theory because of the nature of the relationship between the colonial 
power and the newly independent state. Uti possidetis thus bridges 
the gap between contract theory and property theory, even if 
imperfectly. Finally, the court concludes with an effective control 
inquiry—a purely property law justification. Effective control is most 
analogous to the Anglo-American common law of adverse 
possession.231 
A third possible explanation is that the ICJ is biased toward 
treaties and other legal justifications, and against more political 
arguments. After all, the ICJ is a court of law bound to consider 
certain sources of law as outlined in Article 38 of its Statute. First 
among those is treaty law. Although the Statute itself does not assign 
relative weight to particular sources of law, “most observers” 
maintain that legal rules from international agreements carry the 
most authority.232 Uti possidetis and effective control, as legal 
doctrines, are also authoritative. Uti possidetis is perhaps more 
persuasive because it derives a great deal of its power from treaty law. 
A systemic bias toward legal justifications is not inconsistent with a 
preference for decisions based on equity infra legem over those based 
on political considerations, because there is a basis in international 
law for decisions based on equity.233 Furthermore, any decision based 
purely on political factors would tend to undermine and delegitimize 
the court and the international legal regime. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note considers the nine categories of justifications for 
territorial claims: treaties, geography, economy, culture, effective 
control, history, uti possidetis, elitism, and ideology. This Note also 
examines each of the International Court of Justice’s nine territorial 
dispute cases in light of these categories of claims. Although 
territorial disputants perennially make arguments based on all these 
justifications, only three of these justifications have operated 
consistently as the ICJ’s decision rule: treaty law, uti possidetis, and 
 
 231. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 232. JANIS, supra note 14, at 10–11. 
 233. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. Consider also the court’s own Statute, 
which provides for decisions ex aequo et bono. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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effective control. Only when a decision on any of these three grounds 
is impossible will the court resort to equity in deciding a case. 
The hierarchy among treaties, uti possidetis, and effective control 
has the effect of giving a broad scope to treaty law and possibly 
imputing more meaning to the principle of uti possidetis than it merits 
at this stage in the evolution of public international law. This Note 
outlines only a few of several possible rationales for the ICJ’s 
hierarchy of justifications for territorial claims. Whether a causal 
mechanism exists to explain the hierarchy discussed in this Note 
remains an open question and is ripe for additional research. 
